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I observed [painted] on one of the drums belonging to the 
marines . . . a Rattle-Snake, with this modest motto under it, 
“Don’t tread on me.” . . . Was I wrong, Sir, in thinking this 
a strong picture of the temper and conduct of America?
—An American Guesser, Pennsylvania Journal, 
December 27, 1775
This “American Guesser” (later identified as Benjamin 
Franklin) believed that the rattlesnake on the Gadsden Flag 
captured the essence of colonial American identity: Its lid-
less eyes were a mark of vigilance; its confidence in the face 
of provocation, a sign of courage; its rattle and poisonous 
fangs, symbols of mortal danger to those who encroached on 
its territory. In light of the U.S.’ ongoing campaign against 
terrorism, we believe the Guesser’s question remains rele-
vant today, but that the image of the serpent best reflects 
the mentality of an ideological subculture inside America’s 
borders, not the nation as a whole. The Gadsden Flag pur-
portedly originated with southern soldier-statesman 
Christopher Gadsden (McDonough, 2000). Coincidental or 
not, the “Don’t Tread on Me” phrase he coined as a standard 
for American revolutionaries bears a curious resemblance to 
the ideology of masculine honor believed to characterize 
the region of his residence (e.g., Cash, 1941; Fischer, 1989; 
Leyburn, 1962; Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett, & Cohen, 1996; 
Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Contemporary research suggests that 
this ideology persists today (e.g., Barnes, Brown, & 
Tamborski, 2012; Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009; Henry, 
2009; Leung & Cohen, 2011), and we believe it might moti-
vate militant responses to national honor threats just as it has 
been shown to motivate aggressive responses to personal 
honor threats (e.g., Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 
1996; Nisbett, 1993). Below, we build a rationale for why 
this might be true, and we report two studies that test this 
hypothesis.
Dimensions of Honor
According to Pitt-Rivers (1966), honor has two definitions. 
The first is generally valued across all cultures and is closely 
tied with virtues such as honesty and loyalty. The second, 
however, is valued more by some cultures than others, and 
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Using both college students and a national sample of adults, the authors report evidence linking the ideology of masculine 
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concerns matters of reputation and social standing. Societies 
structured around the second definition are referred to by 
social scientists as cultures of honor. Such cultures exist 
throughout the world, including South America (e.g., Johnson 
& Lipsett-Rivera, 1998), regions of the Mediterranean (e.g., 
Peristiany, 1966), and the U.S. South (e.g., Wyatt-Brown, 
1982). Scholars who have studied honor in these and related 
contexts have focused on several dimensions of the con-
struct, including familial status (e.g., having a good family 
name), female fidelity (e.g., being faithful to one’s spouse), 
and male reputation (e.g., being known as someone who will 
not tolerate insults). For instance, using Dutch participants 
(representative of a nonhonor culture) as a comparison 
group, Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer (2002) 
showed that Spanish participants experienced relatively 
more shame in response to imagining themselves as dis-
graceful members of their families, and the extent to which 
they experienced this emotional reaction more than their 
Dutch counterparts was accounted for by their greater con-
cern with family honor (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Mastead, & Fischer, 2000). In addition, Vandello, Cohen, 
Grandon, and Franiuk (2009) found that participants from 
honor cultures (e.g., Latinos and U.S. southerners), who 
presumably value female loyalty in relationships, evaluated 
a woman who remained committed in an abusive relation-
ship more favorably than participants from nonhonor cul-
tures (e.g., U.S. northerners and Canadians), suggesting that 
cultural concerns with feminine honor could contribute to 
abusive dynamics in relationships (see also Vandello & 
Cohen, 2003).
Common to the theoretical arguments for the above find-
ings is the importance of reputation maintenance in honor 
cultures relative to others. In light of this emphasis, it is not 
surprising that reputational threats in the form of insults 
carry special weight in cultures of honor and elicit a variety 
of negative reactions from members, not the least of which is 
violence, especially among males. The connection between 
honor concerns and male violence and aggression has best 
been demonstrated within the borders of the U.S., comparing 
so-called honor states in the southern (and sometimes west-
ern) U.S. to nonhonor states in the northern part of the coun-
try. Although we do not confine ourselves to regional 
comparisons, it is the connection between honor in the U.S. 
and aggression that interests us in the present article, but it is 
a different form of aggression than has previously been con-
sidered in the literature. Although prior research has focused 
on the link between honor and interpersonal aggression, we 
examine the link between honor and national or collective 
aggression in the form of militant responses terrorism.
Masculine Honor 
Ideology in the U.S.
Of the dimensions of honor highlighted above, one is of 
central importance to the culture of honor in the southern 
U.S.; specifically, it is a concern with men’s reputation for 
toughness, fearlessness, and aggressiveness in the face of 
provocations (Cash, 1941; Fischer, 1989; Nisbett, 1993; 
Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Indeed, 
Fischer (1989) noted that honor in the historical southern 
U.S. “meant a pride of manhood in masculine courage, 
physical strength and warrior virtue” (p. 690). Likewise, 
Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argued that honor in this region 
was a reflection of “a man’s strength and power to enforce 
his will on others” (p. 4). The explanation given for why this 
masculine honor ideology is more prevalent among south-
erners than northerners comes from historians’ observation 
that Scotch-Irish immigrants, who were themselves 
immersed in a culture of honor, mostly settled in the south-
ern regions of the country (Fischer, 1989; Leyburn, 1962; 
Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In the southern U.S., 
their culture persisted presumably because their families and 
resources regularly came under threat, and because a lack of 
organized law enforcement required men to act as the pri-
mary defenders of their homes. Succumbing to sufficient 
provocations in these communities marked one as an easy 
target for exploitation, so violence was often used as social 
proof that one’s family and resources could not be taken 
advantage of without serious, perhaps lethal, retaliation fol-
lowing (Fischer, 1989; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Wyatt-
Brown, 1982; for an alternative view on the origins of honor 
cultures, see Henry, 2009).
Researchers have identified several social influences that 
have propelled this cultural concern with masculine reputa-
tion into the present, especially among southern Whites (e.g., 
Brown & Osterman, 2012; Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Vandello, 
Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). Regional differences in argument-
related homicides (Nisbett, Polly, & Lang, 1995), favorable 
attitudes toward “honorable” violence (Cohen & Nisbett, 
1994), aggressive responses to personal slights (Cohen et al., 
1996), and school violence (Brown et al., 2009) have been 
cited as evidence of its persistent effects. To date, however, 
scholars have almost exclusively emphasized the implica-
tions this mentality has for responses to provocations at the 
personal level. We move beyond this focus by considering 
the link between the ideology of masculine honor in the U.S. 
and militant responses to provocations experienced at the 
national level in the form of terrorism.
Masculine Honor Ideology and 
Militant Responses to Terrorism
Masculine honor ideology in the U.S. could contribute to 
militant responses to terrorism for at least two reasons. First, 
protection of family and possessions is closely associated 
with masculine honor. Therefore, endorsing actions intended 
to safeguard one’s homeland from threats would be expected 
of people who value the honor ethic among men. Second, it 
has been well established that U.S. men who are concerned 
with masculine honor tend to respond to personal insults with 
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aggression (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Daly & Wilson, 1988). 
Construing acts of terrorism as national insults (Slocum, 
2007) suggests that people influenced by this ideology will 
respond similarly to terrorist threats because doing so 
reflects an unwillingness to be disrespected or intimidated, 
whether at the personal or national level. Likewise, to the 
extent that honor cultures coincide with cultural collectivism 
(for examples of such covariation, see Osterman & Brown, 
2011; Peristiany, 1966), and the merging of the personal and 
the collective within the individual self-concept, national 
insults might be experienced like the personal insults that are 
so inflammatory to culture-of-honor men (Cohen et al., 
1996).
Although no research to date has directly linked the ideol-
ogy of masculine honor in the U.S. with responses to terror-
ism, some work has touched on related topics. Ducat (2005), 
for instance, has argued for a connection between honor-
related concerns and conservative politics, of which national 
defense is an important component, and Slocum (2007) has 
proposed that the post-9/11 policies of George W. Bush’s 
administration reflect the honor concerns associated with 
southern U.S. culture (see also McCullough, 2008). More 
direct evidence related to our hypothesis comes from an 
archival study by Cohen (1998) showing that Congresspersons 
from honor states were more supportive of “hawkish” 
national security policies (e.g., using military force in the 
Gulf War) than their counterparts in nonhonor states. Thus, 
it seems plausible to hypothesize a link between masculine 
honor ideology in the U.S. and militant responses to terror-
ism. In Study 1, we test this idea using an individual differ-
ence measure of masculine honor ideology endorsement, and 
in Study 2, we test this idea by distinguishing between 
respondents from an honor state and respondents from a non-
honor state, as has traditionally been done in the literature.
Importantly, we also include women in Study 2. Theorists 
have posited that women play an important role in sustaining 
and perpetuating the culture of honor in the U.S. (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). For instance, Sam 
Houston’s mother awarded him a musket when he joined the 
army with the admonishment to “never disgrace it” by flee-
ing combat to save his life (Wyatt-Brown, 1982, p. 51). 
Likewise, Andrew Jackson’s mother instructed him to never 
take legal action against someone who slandered or harassed 
him, but to instead settle such matters himself (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996, p. 86). Although this evidence is anecdotal, it 
seems reasonable to predict from it that women shaped by 
the culture of honor might support militant responses to ter-
rorism. Such support would not likely be motivated by wom-
en’s interest in maintaining their own reputations for strength 
and toughness, nor would women who endorse militant 
responses necessarily engage personally in the militant 
defending. Nonetheless, women in honor cultures might pro-
nounce such responses as right and good and call upon men 
to defend their country’s good name from the insult of an 
attack. Finding support for this hypothesis would add to the 
growing body of evidence that certain honor-related phe-
nomena emerge among women as well as men (Barnes et al., 
2012; Osterman & Brown, 2011).
Overview of Studies
The goal of our first study was to establish the predicted 
association between masculine honor ideology in the U.S. 
and militant responses to terrorism, including (a) open-
ended responses to a hypothetical terrorist attack on the 
Statue of Liberty, (b) defensive vigilance in situations 
involving potential terrorists, (c) support for using severe 
interrogations with suspected terrorists, and (d) support for 
national defense actions—for example, the “war on terror,” 
controlling for a broad range of covariates shown to predict 
similar outcomes (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism [RWA], 
social dominance orientation [SDO]). Because of the theo-
retical focus on White males from the southern and northern 
U.S. in previous culture-of-honor research, we followed this 
pattern in the pilot study and in Study 1 to establish the 
validity of our new measure of masculine honor ideology 
endorsement. In Study 2, we used the traditional approach to 
operationalizing the culture of honor in the U.S. by compar-
ing White respondents from an honor state to White respon-
dents from a nonhonor state on their support for lethal 
retaliation against the terrorists responsible for 9/11. We also 
included women in Study 2 to explore whether they exhibit 
the militant reactions we expected to observe among men.
Pilot Study: A Measure of Masculine 
Honor Ideology in the U.S.
Research on the culture of honor in the U.S. has relied heav-
ily on Census Bureau divisions as an indirect indicator of 
masculine honor ideology endorsement—that is, states and 
persons belonging to the southern (and western, with the 
exception of Alaska and Hawaii) U.S. are assumed to be 
more concerned with masculine reputation, than those 
belonging to the northern U.S. (e.g., Cohen, 1998). However, 
because individuals’ acceptance of this ideology does not 
perfectly follow regional boundaries (Cohen & Vandello, 
2001; Leung & Cohen, 2011), and because these divisions 
are always used to represent differences in masculine honor 
ideology endorsement among persons, we sought to mea-
sure this endorsement directly, at the individual level, much 
as other scholars have done with related dimensions of 
honor among Spanish and Dutch participants (Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2002; see also IJzerman, van Dijk, & 
Gallucci, 2007) and among Chileans and Canadians 
(Vandello et al., 2009).
Our interest in constructing a new measure of masculine 
honor ideology endorsement is three pronged. First, only one 
item on Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002) scale addresses 
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the importance of a man defending himself against an insult; 
the remaining statements concern issues of sexual prowess 
and familial dynamics. Given the importance of aggressive 
retaliation in response to provocations in research on the 
U.S. culture of honor, we felt this theme should be better 
represented in a masculine honor ideology measure. Indeed, 
the importance of retaliation to the ideology of honor can be 
seen in a recent study by Leung and Cohen (2011) who 
assessed participants’ internalization of honor norms by hav-
ing them rate their support for actors’ use of violence in a 
series of filmed provocations (see also Henry, 2009, Study 4). 
Second, although Vandello et al.’s (2009) scale better reflects 
the U.S. culture of honor described by scholars (e.g., Cash, 
1941; Fischer, 1989; Wyatt-Brown, 1982), it blends items 
about masculine and feminine honor together, and we wished 
to measure beliefs about masculine honor independently. 
Finally, and importantly, none of the above measures have 
been distinguished from other constructs that might be 
expected to covary with the ideology of honor. We created 
the Honor Ideology for Manhood Scale (HIM), in response 
to these issues.
The HIM includes eight statements about the contexts in 
which men have the prerogative to use physical aggression 
for personal and reputational defense (e.g., “A man has the 
right to use physical aggression against another man who 
insults his mother”). These statements were adapted from 
items examined by Cohen and Nisbett (1994), who found 
that White men from honor states endorse the use of physical 
aggression for the purposes of protecting their property, fam-
ily, and personal reputations more than do White men from 
nonhonor states. The HIM also includes eight statements 
about the defining qualities of “real men,” such as self-
sufficiency, pugnacity, and physical toughness (e.g., “A real 
man will never back down from a fight”). All 16 items 
included on the HIM are presented in the appendix and were 
responded to by participants on a scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
The pilot study, part of a larger investigation, was designed 
in part to test for regional differences in the HIM independent 
of constructs such as religiosity, conservatism, education, and 
income, all of which vary regionally and could account for 
any differences we observe in honor ideology endorsement 
among White U.S. men (e.g., Brown et al., 2009). Data were 
collected through Knowledge Networks (KN), an Internet-
based polling agency that maintains a national probability 
sample of U.S. citizens and conducts online survey research 
for the government, universities, and corporations. KN 
obtains its respondents via random digit dialing and address-
based sampling. The former method randomly samples from 
the universe of U.S. landline telephone numbers, and the lat-
ter randomly selects mailing addresses from the U.S. Postal 
Service Sequence File. Computers and Internet access are 
provided to panel members who lack these resources, thereby 
allowing KN to reach individuals within the population 
who are not current Internet users and do not own a personal 
computer. Participants who are not compensated with com-
puters and Internet coverage are included in modest incentive 
programs (e.g., raffles and monetary giveaways), which serve 
as compensation for completing surveys.
Consistent with prior research on the U.S. culture of 
honor, we obtained a sample of 328 White males from the 
southern (i.e., South Census Region: South Atlantic, South 
Central, and West South Central) and northern (i.e., Northeast 
Census Region: New England and Middle Atlantic; Midwest 
Census Region: East North Central, and West North Central) 
U.S. from KN’s nationally representative response panel, 
with the former group representing honor states and the latter 
representing nonhonor states (Cohen, 1998). The age of 
these respondents ranged from 18 to 40 (M = 29.47, SD = 
6.64). Because of missing data on more than two of the HIM 
items, the final sample was reduced to 323 (southern: n = 
165; northern: n = 158). In addition, because of a large num-
ber of missing responses to the single item concerning the 
frequency of religious service attendance (n = 54), we 
imputed scores for these missing values using the average 
frequency of attendance for each region in the sample (M = 3.17 
and 3.46 for north and south regions, respectively). In the 
analyses reported below, all data were adjusted with a demo-
graphic weighting parameter derived from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey for the purpose of gen-
eralizing study findings to the population.1
We submitted the HIM’s 16 items to an exploratory factor 
analysis using principle axis factoring as the extraction 
method. One dominant factor emerged, accounting for 
48.8% of the variance in HIM ratings; the remaining two fac-
tors accounted for much smaller amounts of variance (8.7% 
and 5.9%, respectively) and appeared to reflect formatting 
factors based on differences in wording between the two 
types of statements on the scale (i.e., “A real man . . . ” and 
“A man has the right to use physical aggression . . . ”). 
Importantly, all items loaded positively and strongly on the 
first factor, with a median, unrotated factor loading of .70 
(range = .47-.83). We, therefore, combined these items to 
form our measure of honor ideology endorsement. The 
HIM’s internal reliability was excellent in this sample (α = .94).
We analyzed HIM scores using a multiple regression 
model, including region of residence as the focal predictor 
and single-item indices of religious service attendance, 
conservatism, income, and education as controls. Consistent 
with expectations, we found that southern White males 
(M = 5.12, SE = 0.14) scored higher on the HIM than did 
their northern counterparts (M = 4.61, SE = 0.11), β = .14, 
t(317) = 2.62, p = .009, d = .33. Significant covariates 
included religious service attendance, β = −.20, t(317)= −3.68, 
p < .001; conservatism, β = .11, t(317) = 2.13, p = .03; and 
education, β = −.13, t(317) = −2.30, p = .022; income failed 
to predict the HIM, β = −.09, t(317) = −1.53, ns. Thus, region 
of residence uniquely predicted scores on the HIM, supporting 
the idea that this measure captures a cultural ideology that 
differs among White males from different U.S. regions.
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Further support for the HIM comes from a regression 
analysis that substituted Gastil’s (1971) continuous state-
level measure of southern cultural influence for the dichoto-
mous, regional variable used above. We assigned participants 
values on Gastil index using their state of residence. Although 
this measure has been criticized (e.g., Loftin & Hill, 1974), it 
currently is the only continuous proxy of the culture of honor 
available for U.S. states, and it has been used successfully in 
prior culture-of-honor research (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; 
Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). As with the dichotomous regional 
index, Gastil’s measure also predicted HIM scores, β = .19, 
t(317) = 3.55, p < .001, controlling for religious service 
attendance, conservatism, income, and education. Thus, we 
have added confidence in the HIM’s ability to capture 
endorsement of one of the central features of the cultural ide-
ology of honor in the U.S.—specifically, defense of mascu-
line reputation for strength and toughness.
Study 1
Because protecting hearth and home from threats is impor-
tant to male honor, and because insults are not tolerated by 
honor-minded men, we expected a positive association 
between the HIM and militant responses to terrorism to 
emerge. In Study 1, we sought not only to establish this 
association but also to determine whether it remained when 
we controlled for a host of potentially related covariates 
(e.g., RWA, SDO, religious fundamentalism), some of 
which have been linked in prior research to hostile reactions 
to outgroups, including terrorists (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 
1992; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Crowson, 
2009; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Bertram, 1994; 
Sidanius & Liu, 1992; Wylie & Forest, 1992).
Method
Participants. Participants were 191 young White males from 
a national, online panel maintained by Market Tools Incor-
porated (MTI), an Internet-based marketing research firm. 
Members of MTI’s respondent panel are recruited via online 
advertisements and are compensated for their participation 
with credit usable in an online store. The open nature of the 
panel allows MTI access to individuals fitting a wide range 
of demographic characteristics but does not ensure that it is 
representative of the U.S. population (www.zoomerang.
com). A nontrivial number of participants failed to respond 
to a subset of the scale items in the survey (n = 59). To 
recover a portion of these data, scale totals were computed 
for all participants who were missing responses on no more 
than one item for a given instrument. This left a sample of 
177 respondents, of whom 75 were from the southern U.S. 
(i.e., South Atlantic, South Central, and West South Central) 
and 101 were from the northern U.S. (i.e., Middle Atlantic 
and New England; region data were missing for one person). 
It should be noted that some of the remaining participants 
failed to answer the open-ended question about the hypo-
thetical terrorist attack (n = 27), so analyses involving this 
outcome have slightly fewer respondents and, therefore, dif-
ferent degrees of freedom from the other analyses.
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 55 (M = 31.95, 
SD = 6.77). Regarding education, 19.8% had completed only 
high school, 26.6% finished some college-level work, 32.8% 
completed college, 9.0% had some graduate or professional-
level training, 11.3% had completed graduate or professional 
school, and 0.6% (one) failed to provide this information. No 
information on participants’ income levels was available.
Materials and Procedure. All materials for the study were 
administered online in the order described below. Items 
comprising the first four measures were all created for this 
study.
General aggressiveness (α = .89). Seven items tapped par-
ticipants’ general aggressive tendencies. Three items (“It’s 
easy for me to get angry,” “I have a short fuse,” and “It 
doesn’t take much to set me off”) were statements to which 
respondents indicated their level of agreement on a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale, and four 
items were one-word adjectives (aggressive, peaceful 
[reversed], belligerent, and quarrelsome) that respondents 
identified as being either self-descriptive (7 = [This adjec-
tive] describes me very well) or not (1 = [This adjective] 
does not describe me well). These items were included to 
show that the HIM is not isomorphic with dispositional 
aggressiveness, despite the emphasis on aggressive retalia-
tion in some of the HIM’s items.
Patriotism (α = .89). Participants rated their level of agree-
ment with the following three statements on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale: “Being a U.S. citizen is 
an important part of my identity,” “I have a lot of American 
pride,” and “I think America is the greatest country in the 
world.”2
Religiosity (α = .94). Four items assessed respondents’ 
level of religiousness (“I am very devoted to my religious 
faith,” “I think of myself as a very religious person,” “I am 
not at all religious” [reversed], and “My religious faith is a 
very important part of my life”). These items were responded 
to on the same 7-point scale used for patriotism.
Conservatism. Using a scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) 
to 9 (very conservative), with the midpoint labeled “moder-
ate,” participants answered the following question: “How 
would you describe your political orientation?”
Honor ideology for manhood (α = .92). Participants rated 
their level of agreement with the 16 HIM items using a scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
Religious fundamentalism (RF; α = .93). Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger’s (2004) 12-item RF scale measures defensive 
adherence to religious beliefs irrespective of the sectarian 
origins of those beliefs. Sample items include, “When you 
get right down to it, there are only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the 
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rest who will not” and “The fundamentals of God’s religion 
should never be tampered with or compromised with others’ 
beliefs.” Agreement with each statement was registered by 
participants on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree).
RWA (α = .87). Zakrisson’s (2005) 15-item version of 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) RWA scale was admin-
istered. Respondents rated their agreement with each state-
ment on the same scale used for the RF items. Sample 
statements include “Our country desperately needs a mighty 
leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical 
new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us” and “Our coun-
try will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do 
what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten 
apples” who are ruining everything.”
SDO (α = .88). Participants completed Pratto et al.’s 
(1994) SDO scale by rating how positively they felt toward 
statements such as “Some people are just more worthy than 
others” and “It is important that we treat other countries as 
equals” (reverse scored). Ratings were made on a 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive) scale.
The above scales were treated as predictor variables in 
our analyses. The criterion variables are presented next in the 
order they were completed by participants.
Statue of Liberty attack and terrorist-directed hostility. Par-
ticipants read about a hypothetical attack on the Statue of 
Liberty. The attack, supposedly orchestrated by Afghani ter-
rorists, resulted in the destruction of the monument’s head 
and the death of 250 persons. The scenario was accompanied 
by the image of a headless Statue of Liberty on the front page 
of a fictitious issue of the New York Times, with a headline 
that read, “Afghani Terrorists Strike Lady Liberty: 250 Dead, 
Dozens Seriously Injured.” Participants were instructed to 
write about “the thoughts and feelings [they] would have if 
the Statue of Liberty were actually attacked.” Responses 
were coded by two raters for expressed hostility (i.e., themes 
of hatred, aggression, and vitriol) toward the responsible ter-
rorists. Ratings were made on 7-point scales, with higher 
values representing more hostility. Raters’ judgments were 
highly correlated, r = .88, p < .001, and were averaged 
together to create a composite measure of terrorist-directed 
hostility.
Defensive vigilance (α = .98). Participants were presented 
with four ambiguous situations in which the key actor in 
each might or might not be a terrorist. For example,
You are standing in line at the post office when a dark-
skinned man dressed in Middle Eastern garb walks in 
carrying a large, seemingly unmarked package. He is 
breathing hard, sweating profusely, and keeps looking 
at his watch.
Participants rated how “suspicious,” “threatening,” “hos-
tile,” and “distressing” the target’s behavior seemed to them 
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Next, participants 
were presented with the following statements: “How vigilant 
or alert to danger would you be in the above situation,” 
“Would this man’s behavior suggest to you that something 
bad would happen if action were not immediately taken to 
prevent it,” and “Would you think it appropriate to report 
this man’s behavior to an authority (e.g., the postmaster or 
police)?” Responses to these items were made on 9-point 
scales with appropriate pole labels (e.g., “not at all alert” vs. 
“very alert” and “definitely not” vs. “definitely yes”). All 
responses were averaged together to form an index of defen-
sive vigilance across all four ambiguous threat scenarios.
Support for severe interrogations (α = .96). Four statements 
captured the extent to which respondents supported the use 
of severe interrogations with suspected terrorists (e.g., 
“Interrogators should do everything in their power to draw 
information out of suspected terrorists, even if it means using 
methods that cause those persons lasting physical or psycho-
logical problems”). Ratings were made on a 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale.
Support for military action (α = .80). Finally, participants 
rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
disagree) their level of agreement with six statements about 
their support for using aggressive military action in the 
U.S.’s campaign against terrorism, including “I am in favor 
of the U.S.’s war against terrorism,” “It is entirely appropri-
ate to engage in preemptive attacks on countries that are sus-
pected of harboring or supporting terrorists,” and “If 
necessary, the U.S. should use nuclear [and, in a separate 
question, chemical] weapons to defend its interests against 
those of terrorists.” Four of these items were borrowed from 
Pyszczynski et al. (2006).
Results and Discussion
Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for all Study 1 
variables appear in Table 1, and detailed regression results 
can be seen in Table 2. The goal of Study 1 was to determine 
whether an individual difference measure capturing endorse-
ment of one of the central features of the U.S. culture of 
honor (i.e., concerns with the defense of masculine reputa-
tion) might predict militant responses to terrorism, control-
ling for conceptually related measures, such as RWA, SDO, 
and RF.3 To test this possibility, we examined the HIM’s 
ability to predict each of our outcome measures, including 
participants’ open-ended responses to the Statue of Liberty 
attack (i.e., terrorist-directed hostility), controlling for the 
covariates of RF, RWA, SDO, patriotism, and aggressive-
ness. Regressing terrorist-directed hostility onto the vari-
ables listed above revealed the HIM as a significant 
predictor of this construct, β = .31, t(143) = 3.81, p < .001, 
indicating that the HIM predicts participant-generated 
hostile responses to terrorism. Importantly, the HIM also 
predicted responses to our Likert-scale survey items tapping 
defensive vigilance, β = .23, t(170) = 3.24, p = .001, support 
for severe interrogations, β = .19, t(170) = 2.79, p = .001, and 
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support for military action, β = .15, t(170) = 2.11, p = .036. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate the unique pre-
dictive utility of the HIM for responses to terrorism.
In our initial regression analyses, we omitted religiosity 
and conservatism as covariates because of their strong con-
ceptual overlap with RF and RWA, respectively; however, 
we recognize the potential contribution these variables could 
make to our results (e.g., Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 
2005), so we reran our equations adding religiosity and con-
servatism to our original set of covariates. Even with these 
additions, the HIM predicted terrorist-directed hostility, β = .32, 
t(141) = 3.82, p < .001; defensive vigilance, β = .22, t(168) = 3.02, 
p = .003; and support for severe interrogations, β = .17, 
t(168) = 2.42, p = .016; its association with support for mili-
tary action was marginally significant, β = .14, t(168) = 1.90, 
p = .059. We believe the persistent ability of the HIM to 
Table 1. Intercorrelations Between and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Variables (With Scale Alphas on Diagonal)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 1. Religiosity .94  
 2. Religious fundamentalism .67*** .93  
 3. Conservatism .35*** .35*** —  
 4. Right-wing authoritarianism .47*** .74*** .48*** .87  
 5. Social dominance orientation .05 .09 .27*** .25*** .88  
 6. Patriotism .08 .19** .32*** .32*** .18** .89  
 7. General aggressiveness −.06 −.01 .16** .10 .32*** .01 .89  
 8.  Honor ideology for 
manhood
−.02 .07 .29*** .21*** .25*** .22*** .37*** .92  
 9. Terrorist-directed hostility .09 .10 .23*** .18** .29*** .31*** .12 .39*** —  
10. Defensive vigilance .13* .20*** .33*** .36*** .10 .42*** .15* .35*** .33*** .98  
11. Severe interrogations .12 .19** .43*** .46*** .37*** .34*** .20*** .36*** .36*** .55*** .96  
12. Military action .18** .28*** .38*** .46*** .34*** .36*** .21*** .33*** .26*** .55*** .65*** .80
M 3.79 3.63 5.46 3.70 3.19 5.44 3.12 5.37 3.51 6.29 5.64 5.24
SD 1.92 1.46 1.84 1.04 1.13 1.47 1.25 1.50 2.10 1.66 2.50 1.79
*.10 > p > . 05. **p < .05. ***p < .01.




hostility Defensive vigilance Severe interrogations Military action
Predictors β t β t β t β t
Model 1
 Fundamentalism .05 0.44 −.08 −0.85 −.24 −2.67*** −.05 −0.53
 Patriotism .21 2.56** .30 4.31*** .15 2.35** .19 2.85***
 Authoritarianism −.03 −0.26 .30 2.88*** .51 5.22*** .36 3.60***
 Social dominance .19 2.38** −.09 −1.33 .18 2.76*** .17 2.43**
 Aggressiveness −.04 −0.46 .05 0.75 .02 0.26 .06 0.92
 Honor ideology .31 3.81*** .23 3.24*** .19 2.79*** .15 2.11**
Model 2
 Religiosity .11 1.04 .04 0.41 .00 −0.04 .02 0.23
 Fundamentalism −.03 −0.21 −.11 −1.00 −.25 −2.36** −.07 −0.63
 Patriotism .21 2.53** .29 4.05*** .13 1.94* .18 2.60**
 Conservatism .03 0.30 .09 1.18 .16 2.18** .09 1.21
 Authoritarianism −.04 −0.33 .27 2.51** .45 4.58*** .33 3.19***
 Social dominance .18 2.23** −.11 −1.47 .17 2.52** .16 2.27**
 Aggressiveness −.03 −0.42 .05 0.71 .01 0.15 .06 0.87
 Honor ideology .32 3.82*** .22 3.02*** .17 2.42** .14 1.90*
*.10 > p > .05. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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predict the outcomes assessed in this study, even in the pres-
ence of such important covariates, highlights the HIM as a 
unique index of a cultural ideological construct in the U.S. 
not captured by these other individual difference measures. 
These results also show, for the first time, the relevance of 
this ideology to responses to terrorism, including hypervigi-
lance to terrorism-related cues and support for extreme mili-
tary actions (e.g., nuclear and chemical bombs).
Study 2
Study 1 showed that individual endorsement of masculine 
honor values predicted hostile and militant responses to a 
hypothetical terrorist attack. This is one of only a few recent 
studies that have attempted to capture the culture of honor at 
an individual level (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; Leung & 
Cohen, 2011). To better demonstrate that the honor–
militancy association in the U.S. has a collective/cultural 
manifestation, our final study shifts from the individual level 
of analysis to the regional level used in most pervious 
research. Specifically, Study 2 involved a reanalysis of U.S. 
students’ reactions to the terrorists attacks of 9/11 (see 
Barnes & Brown, 2010; Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008). We 
compared reactions of White students at two universities, 
one located in the southwestern region of the U.S. (Oklahoma) 
and the other located in the northeastern region of the U.S. 
(Pennsylvania), with respect to their desire for lethal retali-
ation against those responsible for the attacks. Based on the 
treatment of these states in prior research, we reasoned that 
participants at the school in the southwestern U.S. would 
exhibit the culture of honor, whereas participants at the 
school in the northeastern U.S. would not (e.g., Cohen, 
1998). In addition, because women may help sustain and 
perpetuate the culture of honor in the U.S., even if they do 
not personally display the same violent behaviors that this 
culture rewards among men (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; 
Vandello et al., 2009; Wyatt-Brown, 1982), we investigated 
whether White women from an honor state would exhibit an 
aggressive response to a national-level provocation along-
side their male counterparts. The dependent variable of 
interest in Study 2 was the extent to which participants 
wanted those responsible for 9/11 to be killed, and we con-
trolled for levels of patriotism and religiosity to ensure that 
any regional difference obtained was not simply a function 
of these potential confounds.
Method
Participants. A collection of questionnaires was administered 
during the 2 weeks following 9/11 to 442 White students 
(268 females, 173 males) at two prominent universities in the 
U.S.: The University of Oklahoma (OU: n = 193) and Pennsyl-
vania State University (PSU: n = 249). According to prior 
research, OU is located in a state characterized by a culture 
of honor, whereas PSU is not (Cohen, 1998). An additional 
111 students completed the questionnaires, but their data 
were excluded from this study either because their ethnicity 
could not be determined (n = 18) or because their non-White 
demographic is not the focus of culture-of-honor theory and 
research in the U.S. Importantly, no other racial or ethnic 
group had sufficiently large numbers at both campuses to 
serve as an adequate comparison group. Course credit was 
granted to students in exchange for participation.
An additional three participants were lost from the sample 
because of missing responses on one or more key variables. 
This left a final sample of 439 students (OU: n = 191: 
70 male; PSU: n = 248: 103 male). Specific religious affilia-
tion was unknown for most participants. Of the remaining 
participants (n = 153), all identified themselves as Christian 
(17% Catholic).
Measures and Procedure. The week following 9/11, 
researchers at OU and PSU compiled a series of question-
naires designed to tap different aspects of participants’ psy-
chological reactions to the event.4 Patriotism was measured 
by taking the average of participants’ rated agreement with 
three statements, which were created for this study and were 
similar to those used in Study 1: “I consider myself to 
be patriotic,” “I have strong feelings of patriotism about the 
USA,” and “I feel very proud to be a U.S. citizen.” Ratings 
were made on a 7-point scale, with higher ratings indicating 
stronger agreement (α = .88). Religiosity was measured with 
five questions, also created for this study: “I consider myself 
to be a religious person,” “I consider myself to be a spiritual 
person,” “I am not religious” (reverse scored), “I am a mem-
ber of an organized religion,” and “I regularly attend reli-
gious services.” These ratings were also made on a 7-point 
scale with higher ratings indicating stronger agreement 
(α = .89). To tap desires for lethal retaliation against the 9/11 
terrorists, participants responded to the question, “To what 
extent do you feel right now that you want those responsible 
for the attacks to be killed,” on a 9-point scale ranging from 
1 (not at all) to 9 (completely).
Results and Discussion
Regressing the lethal retaliation item simultaneously on uni-
versity affiliation, patriotism, and religiosity revealed a sig-
nificant association with university affiliation, β = .17, 
t(435) = 3.57, p < .001, d = .35. Specifically, participants 
from OU reported that they wanted those responsible for 
9/11 to be killed (M = 6.80, SE = 0.20) more than did par-
ticipants from PSU (M = 5.86, SE = 0.17).5 In addition, 
patriotism was a significant covariate in this analysis, β = .21, 
t(435) = 4.50, p < .001; religiosity was marginally signifi-
cant, β = −.09, t(435) = −1.80, p = .073. Importantly, 
endorsement of lethal retaliation differed by university 
among males, β = .17, t(169) = 2.28, p = .024, d = .36 (OU: 
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M = 6.90, SE = 0.32; PSU: M = 5.94; SE = 0.27), and 
females, β = .16, t(262) = 2.66, p = .008, d =.34 (OU: M = 
6.73, SE = 0.25; PSU: M = 5.82; SE = 0.23). From these 
results, it is possible to conclude that residing in an honor 
state where an ideology of honor dominates among Whites 
is associated with advocating the death of the terrorists 
responsible for 9/11, and this association cannot be attrib-
uted to regional differences in patriotism or religiosity. 
Furthermore, Study 2 extends the results of Study 1 to show 
that the culture of honor could lead to lethal attitudes in 
response to terrorism among women as well as men—one of 
the first such demonstrations in the literature on the U.S. 
culture of honor and violence (for other honor-related out-
comes among women, see Barnes et al., 2012 and Osterman 
& Brown, 2011).
General Discussion
The present studies are the first to provide evidence that the 
cultural ideology of honor implicated in interpersonal vio-
lence (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) has 
implications for the intergroup phenomenon of people’s 
responses to terrorism. In the pilot study, we reported evi-
dence that endorsement of masculine honor ideology in the 
U.S. can be successfully tapped at the individual level using 
the HIM (cf. IJzerman et al., 2007; Leung & Cohen, 2011; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Vandello et al., 2009). We 
then proceeded to use this instrument in a study using a 
national sample of White males (Study 1). Participants in 
this study were asked to respond to four indicators of mili-
tant responses to terrorism. Consistent with expectations, 
scores on the HIM significantly predicted (a) terrorist-
directed hostility, coded from open-ended responses to a 
hypothetical terrorist attack; (b) defensive vigilance across 
multiple, ambiguous threat scenarios; (c) support for severe 
interrogations with suspected terrorists; and (d) support for 
military action in the U.S.’s campaign against terrorism. It is 
noteworthy that scores on the HIM were predictive of these 
responses controlling for a host of related measures, such as 
RWA, SDO, patriotism, and religious fundamentalism. 
These results provide further support for the value of mea-
suring masculine honor ideology at the individual level (e.g., 
Barnes et al., 2012; Osterman & Brown, 2011; Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2002; Vandello et al., 2009) and point to the 
contribution this ideology makes to issues of national and 
global importance.
Study 2 used the more common approach social psychol-
ogists have taken to capture the culture of honor in the U.S.: 
regional differences. In this study, we examined college stu-
dents’ desires for retaliation against the terrorists who 
attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 
11, 2001. As expected, White students from a school in an 
honor state in the southwestern U.S. reported a greater desire 
for lethal retaliation during the 2 weeks following the 9/11 
attacks than did their counterparts from a school in a non-
honor state in the northeastern U.S. This finding extends the 
responses to the hypothetical measures of Study 1 to real 
responses to an actual terrorist attack. Also in Study 2, we 
examined whether any gender differences occurred, and 
none were found—a noteworthy departure from the bulk of 
literature on aggression and violence in the U.S. culture of 
honor, which shows that with respect to interpersonal vio-
lence, women from honor states do not exhibit the same 
elevated rates of homicide and assault that males from honor 
states do (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Recent research, how-
ever, reveals that women living in honor states do exhibit 
some of the same honor-related behaviors that men do, 
including excessive risk taking (Barnes et al., 2012) and sui-
cide (Osterman & Brown, 2011). We suspect that the reason 
for this difference in gendered behavior patterns concerns 
the fact that the endorsement of lethal retaliation is not the 
same as personally engaging in homicide or assault. Indeed, 
homicidal violence is something that women rarely engage 
in, and when they do, it is not typically for the same reasons 
that men do (Daly & Wilson, 1988). Even so, the present 
results underscore the interesting possibility that women 
who live in honor cultures, or who embrace the beliefs and 
values of an honor culture, might display a number of impor-
tant motives and behaviors that are similar to those of honor-
culture men.
Limitations and Future Directions
Absent from this research is evidence that masculine honor 
concerns in the U.S. shape behavioral responses to terror-
ism. We do not wish to downplay the importance of such 
evidence, but we feel it is noteworthy that when it comes to 
a nation responding to terrorism, most people never have the 
opportunity to interrogate a terrorist suspect or fire artillery 
into a terrorist-harboring country. People do, however, have 
ample opportunities to express their attitudes about terrorism 
through debates with peers, opinion polls, voting, and letters 
to congresspersons. Consequently, we believe that the col-
lection of dependent variables examined here constitutes a 
good starting point for behavioral research in this area.
The hypothetical nature of the Statue of Liberty attack 
and defensive vigilance items is another limitation of this 
research, as numerous scholars have noted that forecasted 
responses in hypothetical contexts are often incongruent 
with responses to real situations (e.g., Ajzen, Brown, & 
Carvajal, 2004; Armor & Sackett, 2006; Barnes & Brown, 
2010). This limitation does not apply, however, to our inter-
rogation and military action items, which assessed partici-
pants’ position on these issues in general, not with respect to 
hypothetical scenarios. Likewise, this limitation does not 
apply to Study 2, which evaluated individuals’ reactions to 
the attacks of 9/11 within 2 weeks of the event. Thus, the 
data from this latter investigation nicely complement the 
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hypothetical stimuli used in Study 1 and supports the validity 
of Study 1’s conclusions.
Our focus in these studies was on reactions to foreign ter-
rorist attacks as a function of the ideology of masculine 
honor in the U.S., and we have argued that this construct 
influences the form these reactions take. If we turned the 
tables, however, we could consider how this ideology might 
function as an impetus for committing acts of terrorism. 
Whether a perceived injustice is perpetrated by a govern-
ment against its citizens, or one country against another, the 
ideology we have described might motivate individuals to 
defend their convictions with violence or, at least, to judge 
less harshly those who share their convictions and use vio-
lence to defend them. Indeed, researchers have implicated 
honor-related motives—in particular, the desire to restore 
lost honor or to prevent future losses to honor—as a common 
feature underlying many terrorist attacks, including the 
rather extreme instances of suicide bombings (e.g., Atran, 
2003; Bloom, 2005; Crenshaw, 2007; Kruglanski, Chen, 
Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009). As Kruglanski et al. 
(2009) noted, “In some cases, [one’s cultural] norms and ide-
ologies may identify the suicide mission against one’s ene-
mies as a most honorable act, lending one a sense of immense 
veneration and significance” (p. 338). Although suicide 
bombings might seem extreme and “exotic” examples of 
behavior, Osterman and Brown (2011) have recently found 
that more “mundane” instances of suicide in the U.S. can be 
linked to a culture of honor. Given this parallel finding, it 
might very well be that even acts of domestic terrorism in the 
U.S. are driven, in part, by honor motives. This argument 
raises the interesting possibility that the promotion and 
defense of honor might motivate the same people both to 
respond with militant aggression to acts of terrorism and to 
engage in terrorist acts, under certain circumstances.
Conclusion
In his State of the Union address in 2001, President 
George W. Bush issued this ultimatum: “Every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make. Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Insofar as Bush’s 
warning reflects his cultural upbringing (McCullough, 
2008; Slocum, 2007), his words suggest to us that the 
dynamics of the U.S. culture of honor might be played out 
on the national level as well as the individual one (Slocum, 
2007). In today’s complex world, the bifurcation of human-
ity into those who are “with us” and those who are “with 
the terrorists” might impede otherwise healthy inter-
national relations (see also, Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, 
& Victoroff, 2007). In the end, military conflict might not 
be averted, but insofar as honor-based motives to aggress 
against terrorists can be critically evaluated, perhaps deci-
sions about international confrontations that cast an eye 
toward the long-term costs and consequences of such 
conflicts can be made.
Appendix
Honor Ideology for Manhood (HIM)
 1. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who calls him an insulting name.
 2. A real man doesn’t let other people push him around.
 3. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who slanders his family.
 4. A real man can always take care of himself.
 5. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who openly flirts with his wife.
 6. A real man never lets himself be a “door mat” to 
other people.
 7. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who trespasses on his personal 
property.
 8. A real man can “pull himself up by his bootstraps” 
when the going gets tough.
 9. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who mistreats his children
10. A real man will never back down from a fight.
11. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who steals from him.
12. A real man never leaves a score unsettled.
13. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who vandalizes his home.
14. A real man doesn’t take any crap from anybody.
15. A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who insults his mother.
16. A real man is seen as tough in the eyes of his peers.
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Notes
1. Removing the weighting parameter and running the regression 
analyses on the unadjusted data reduced the regional difference 
in HIM scores to marginal significance, β = .10, t(317) = 1.92, p = 
.056; the predictive power of Gastil’s (1971) index, however, was 
virtually unaffected by this change, β = .12, t(317) = 2.23, p = .026.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1028  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38(8)
2. It could be that hostile responses to terrorism are isolated to or 
are particularly pronounced among those who are patriotic and 
identify with the cultural ideology of honor, but no evidence was 
found for this hypothesis in either Study 1 or Study 2, both of 
which assessed patriotism.
3. Although we tested for regional differences in the HIM and 
our outcome measures in Study 1, we found no significant dif-
ferences by region, with the exception of support for military 
reactions. It should be noted that although the differences were 
nonsignificant, southerners endorsed the HIM more than north-
erners did in Study 1, as in the pilot study, and the regional 
differences on the remaining three dependent variables  in this 
study were consistently in the predicted direction. We suspect 
that the lack of significant regional differences is due to the non-
representative nature of the sample in Study 1 compared with 
the sample used in the pilot study, although we cannot be certain 
of this. However, our failure to find consistent regional differ-
ences in Study 1 led us to focus more attention on this matter in 
Study 2.
4. We gratefully acknowledge the help of Jennifer Bosson and 
Elizabeth Pinel in gathering data used in this study.
5. Not surprisingly, most participants in our sample expressed 
a desire for lethal retaliation. This resulted in a negatively 
skewed distribution for this item. Squaring the data adequately 
corrected this problem. The results obtained by analyzing the 
transformed lethal retaliation item were the same as those 
reported in the text.
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